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I. INTRODUCTION
During the Colonial period of Latin American history the con-
duct of officials appointed by the Spanish crown to serve in the
provinces was subject to a formal review at the end of their term of
office. At the public hearing, or residencia, anyone in the jurisdic-
tion could appear before the presiding officer to present charges or
to testify either for or against the incumbent. When an unfavora-
ble judgment was rendered, the office-holder had to make restitu-
tion to the persons he had mistreated, or perhaps undergo more
severe punishment. No one could leave office without first submit-
ting to the residencia.'
Recently, the military junta in Argentina, nearing the end of
its reign, engaged in a ritual that it presumably hoped would be
accepted as an "accounting" for its rule over the past seven years.
First, there was that inglorious little war over those islands. It
seemed a simple enough adventure, sure to produce the sort of he-
roes whose past misconduct one finds easy to forgive. Unfortu-
nately, the Brits fought back.'
© Copyright 1983 by Frederick E. Snyder. All rights reserved.
* Assistant Dean for International and Comparative Legal Studies and Lecturer on
Latin American Law, Harvard Law School.
1. See generally, J.M. MARILUZ URQu1ZO, ENSAYO SOBRE LOS JUICIOS DE RESIDENCIA INDI-
ANOS (1952); C. GIBSON, SPAIN IN AMERICA 100 (1967); B. KEEN & M. WASSERMAN, A SHORT
HISTORY op LATIN AMERICA 92 (1980).
2. For a discussion of the 1982 Falkland/Malvinas Islands War, see B. DE CARRIL, THE
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Its second ploy was an attempt to persuade the leaders of the
political parties scheduled to compete in the national elections
promised for October, 1983 to agree that the winning party would
not investigate crimes committed by the military during the
junta's reign. No one agreed.' Ultimately, the junta issued a report
in effect conceding, if only in part, its responsibility for adding a
new word to the vocabulary of state terror, "desaparecido."4 Like
Macbeth shrinking before the phantom of his past, however, the
junta laced its confession with what appeared to be an almost pet-
ulant rhetoric of justification: all of the desperate measures that
were taken against Leftists and others between 1976 and 1979, it
said, were prompted by a very real need to restore the social fabric
that had been torn by urban guerilla warfare in the mid-
1970's-"they got what they deserved."
Not everyone in Argentina, however, agreed, particularly par-
ents of the disappeared. Shortly after the report was televised, the
Mothers-Las Madres de la Plaza de Mayo-condemned the doc-
ument as "nothing more than a new and vain attempt to elude
justice and assure impunity for the cowards responsible for the Ar-
gentine horror and tragedy of this past decade."6 Human rights or-
ganizations, politicians gearing up for the elections and opinion
leaders were quick to denigrate the report and to demand a "true"
accounting.7
The easy way to avoid punishment under the old residencia,
of course, was to pay a witness to either say the right thing about
one's incumbency or to decline to testify at all. An official might
have also avoided potential repercussions by purchasing a
MALVINAS/FALKLANDS CASE (1982). The author has compiled a collection of materials (news-
paper clippings, speeches made before organs of the United Nations and the Organization of
American States, and press releases) illustrating the arguments advanced by the Argentine
authorities during the conflict on file at Harvard Law School.
3. Schumacher, Argentina after the Falklands, N.Y. Times, Dec. 26, 1982, § 6 (maga-
zine), at 14.
4. For a description and partial [unofficial] translations of the April 28, 1983, televised
report, see Latin America Weekly Report, May 6, 1983, at 5, col. 1.
5. Id.
6. The statement was reported by the Associated Press. See Thousands who disap-
peared are dead, Argentina reports, Boston Globe, April 29, 1983, at 10.
7. See generally, Latin America Weekly Report, April 29, 1983, at 5, col. 1; Hatch, Ar-
gentine Democracy's Obstacles, The Boston Globe, May 16, 1983, at 2. European reaction to
the junta's report, particularly on the part of the Vatican, was especially severe; see Kamm,
Vatican Assails Argentine Junta Over Its Report on War on Leftists, N.Y. Times, May 4,
1983, at A 10, col. 1.
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favorable judgment outright from the hearing officer.8 For the
junta, however, there are no such alternatives. The junta is ac-
countable not to a mere king or his delegate, but to the Argentine
people as a whole. Some say the junta is accountable to the world
as well, for all of us have been "witnesses" of the regime's trans-
gressions of so many fundamental human rights, in such great
measure. How can one bribe an entire society, to say nothing of an
international community, especially when annual inflation of 100 %
and more combined with a poorly conceived and managed network
of economic programs have all but emptied the national
treasury?'
Apparently, all the junta could do was to try to excuse it-
self-a dubious enterprise at best. In its final days, the junta began
to test popular reaction to its plan to declare an amnesty for mili-
tary and security officials who violated the law during the junta's
rule." At first blush, the junta's preoccupation with the need for a
workable principle of legality to vindicate its notorious departures
from lawfulness is somewhat baffling. Wouldn't it be simpler to
grab the first plane out of Buenos Aires and seek refuge with an-
other like-minded regime the day after the October 1983 elections,
or whenever and howsoever it is that the transfer of power takes
place? Isn't that what Latin American military dictators are sup-
posed to do?
II. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
The Argentine case stands as an intriguing example of the in-
determinacy of the language of law and justice, of the magical
properties attributed to legal terminology, and of the inevitable
vulnerability of apparently autonomous legal institutions and
8. See MARILUZ URQUIZO, supra, note 1.
9. There have been numerous reports documenting official violations, on a large scale,
of human rights generally recognized under international law. See e.g., Inter-American Com-
mission on Human Rights, Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Argentina, OEA/
ser.L/V/11.49, doc. 19 corr. 1, Washington, D.C., April 11, 1980 [hereinafter cited as IACHR
Report]; Amnesty International, Report of An Amnesty International Mission to Argentina
6-15 November 1976 (1976) (hereinafter cited as Amnesty International Report].
10. For descriptions of Argentina's current economic situation, see IhrN-AMERICAN DE-
VELOPMENT BANK 1982 REPORT, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROGRESS IN LATIN AMERICA, 183-88
(1982); F. GozE, Y. Locosm, A VALLAD O, WORLD VIEw 1983, 160-62 (P. Ayrton trans. and
ed. 1982); Barbieri, From Speculation to Economic Disaster, Latin America Press, March
10, 1983, at 3; Schumacher, Argentina's 200% Inflation, N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 1983, at D1,
col. 1.
11. See Latin America Weekly Report, April 29, 1983, at 5, col. 1; Hatch, supra note, 7.
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processes to manipulation by the forces in a society in actual con-
trol of real political power. There is, for example, a constitu-
tion-one of Latin America's oldest and most durable. 2 Like the
documents of the liberal democracies of the North, the Argentine
constitution purports to serve as a map of the country's political
and social pathways. It tells us how government power is di-
vided-among executive, legislative and judicial departments." It
tells us who the citizens are, who the "people" are, and how their
individual liberties are immune from state violence."' It tells us
that the Constitution is itself an emblem of "national union" dedi-
cated to the goals of "ensuring justice, preserving domestic peace,
providing for the common defense, promoting the general welfare,
and securing the blessings of liberty to ourselves, to our property,
and to all men in the world who wish to dwell on Argentine soil."'"
The Constitution also contains a clause that essentially
amounts to a curious declaration of the very futility of constitu-
tion-making a la manera yanqui, given the volatility of political
life in Argentina. Article 23 provides that in the event of "internal
disorder" or "foreign invasion" placing in jeopardy "the operation
of this Constitution and of the authorities created thereby," the
area in which the disturbance occurs "shall be declared in a state
of siege" and the constitutional guarantees "shall be suspended" in
that area.'"
Tinkering with constitutional safeguards during periods of do-
mestic upheaval is not unknown in liberal democracies: Recall, for
example, Abraham Lincoln's suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus during the Civil War in North America, with the later ap-
proval of the United States Supreme Court.1 7 Such measures are,
however, taken with great caution or reluctance, or at last surrepti-
tiously-and always with considerable embarrassment. The Argen-
tine Constitution treats its own suspension of protections as some-
how predictable, albeit regrettable nonetheless. Article 23 emerges
12. CONSTrruCi6N DE LA NAC16N ARGENTINA (1853). Citations are to the 1968 Pan Amer-
ican Union Translation, reprinted in 1 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD. (A
Bloustein & G. Flanz, eds. 1971) [hereinafter cited as CONSTITUCION].
13. Id., arts. 36-103.
14. Id., arts. 14-20.
15. Id., Preamble.
16. Id., art. 23.
17. Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2, 125 (1866) held the suppression of the writ of habeas
corpus permissible in areas where armed violence makes the enforcement of the civil law
impossible. See L. TamE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 179, n. 39 (1978).
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from its text as an almost surrealistic tribute to the violence born
of Argentina's arrested development as a Nation, and perhaps a
strangely defiant salute to the malformation of the political econ-
omy of Latin America as a whole.
The clause does not end here, however. It tries next to identify
the boundaries within which executive action may proceed during
a state of siege. Thus, "during such suspension the President of the
Republic shall not convict or apply punishment upon his authority.
His power shall be limited, in such a case, with respect to persons,
to arresting them or transferring them from one point of the Na-
tion to another, if they do not prefer to leave Argentine terri-
tory."18 The voice of the Constitution may be muted during the
crisis, but an echo, however faint, will continue to resonate through
the palace of the President. "Constitutional law" may hibernate,
but "law" will remain alive and well albeit to a lesser degree. The
government may exercise extraordinary powers during the state of
siege, but its performance must be tidy. In other words, revolt and
reaction may be permanent characteristics of the political life of
the nation, but we are not barbarians. This appears to be the mes-
sage and meaning, the hope and fear of this ambivalent constitu-
tional text.
This ambiguity, which lies at the heart of Argentina's political
charter, provides a rich opportunity for the production of an appa-
ratus of legality on behalf of regimes the legitimacy of whose ac-
tions would otherwise appear very fragile indeed. Article 23 makes
it possible for a regime exercising "emergency" powers to create a
legal image for itself, or rather, an image of the power it is exercis-
ing as 'legal,' i.e. as grounded in law. The military junta took full
advantage of this opportunity in 1976 when it seized control of the
state from the exhausted government of Maria Estela [Isabel]
Martinez de Per6n, which had declared the country to be in a state
of siege since later 1974.19
Within hours after the golpe, the junta's office became the
fountainhead of a steady stream of public addresses, institutional
acts, statutes, decrees, and resolutions describing the goals of the
new government and prescribing and proscribing various forms of
social and political bahavior. In his first major public speech as
18. CONsTrCcI6N, supra note 12, art. 23.
19. Decreto 1.368, Nov. 6, 1974 [1974] Anales de Legislaci6n Argentina 3525 [hereinaf-
ter cited as C Anales].
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President on April 5, 1976, General Jorge Rafael Videla explained
the junta's motivation as safeguarding the "highest interests" of
the nation, a mission generally entrusted to the military under the
Constitution:
Profoundly respectful of constitutional powers, the natural
underpinning of democratic institutions, the armed forces on re-
peated occasions, sent clear warnings to [Isabel Per6n's] govern-
ment about the dangers that existed and also about the short-
comings of their senseless acts. Its voice went unheard, and as a
consequence not one single measure was adopted. Therefore,
every hope of institutional change was completely dashed. In the
face of this dramatic situation, the armed forces assumed con-
trol of the government.20
The junta's mission now, he continued, was to bring the promises
of Argentina's constitution to life by making its government work:
[Ilt is precisely to ensure the just protection of the natural
rights of man that we assume the full exercise of authority; not
to infringe upon liberty but to reaffirm it; not to twist justice
but to impose it. After reestablishing an effective authority,
which will be revitalized at all levels, we will turn to the organi-
zation of the state, whose performance will be based on the per-
manence and stability of juridical norms which will guarantee
the primacy of law and the observance of it by the governors
and governed alike.2 1
Summarizing, he said that all the measures the junta proposed to
take were aimed "both at achieving general well-being through
productive labor and at developing a genuine spirit of social jus-
tice" with the goal of forming "a vigorous, organized, and unified
society that is spiritually and culturally prepared to forge a better
future.''22
The junta had articulated the general content of this revital-
ized society in its Act Determining the Purpose and Basic Objec-
tives for the Process of National Reorganization, of March 24,
1976.23 The emphasis was to be on the maintenance of state secur-
20. A Time for Fundamental Reorganization of the Nation, speech by General Jorge
Rafael Videla, in THE POLITICS OF ArNi-POL.Ics: THE MIIraY IN LATIN AMERICA 179
(trans. and ed. from La Nacion [Buenos Aires], April 5, 1976) (B. Loveman & T.M. Davies,
Jr. ed. 1978).
21. Id., at 180.
22. Id.
23. Acta Fijando el Proposito y los Objetivos Basicos para el Proceso de Reorganizaci6n
Nacional arts. 1, 2, March 24, 1976 [1976] C Anales 1020.
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ity, the preservation of the national heritage, the promotion of pri-
vate enterprise, and the development of a close relationship be-
tween the state, capital and labor. To reinforce these declarations,
on the next day, the junta effectively proclaimed itself the real and
exclusive source of law through the "Statute for the Process of Na-
tional Reorganization,"24 whereby it dissolved the federal and pro-
vincial legislative bodies, fired all the key federal and provincial
government officials, and prohibited all political party and union
activity throughout the country. The junta declared that the con-
stitution was to remain in force only "to the extent that it does not
oppose the main objectives set forth by the military junta or the
provisions" of the law.25
These acts and statutes coupled with similar laws were
designed to serve as the basis for a series of statutes and decrees
that severely restricted the individual rights and liberties of Argen-
tine citizens. The most draconian of these was undoubtedly the
"Act to Consider the Conduct of Those Persons Who Prejudice the
Higher Interests of the Nation," in which the junta assumed "the
power and responsibility to review the actions of those individuals
who have injured the national interest."26 The Act specified a num-
ber of grounds that would justifiably trigger the government's con-
cern: serious negligence in the exercise of a public, political or so-
cial interest; acts or omissions that facilitate subversion; and
tolerance of administrative corruption or negligence leading to cor-
ruption. The Act also endorsed government action where there was
a "failure to observe basic moral principles in the exercise of pub-
lic, political or union offices or activities that involve the public
interest. '2 7
Article 23 of the Constitution barred the junta from convicting
or punishing any person upon its own authority. The Institutional
Act skirted this problem by authorizing the junta to apply a vari-
ety of intermediate sanctions, short of "punishment" to persons
caught in the net. Such milder sanctions included: loss of political
or union rights; loss of citizenship for naturalized Argentinians;
disqualification from public office; and confinement, during which
24. Estatuto pars el Proceso de Reorganizaci6n Nacional, March 25, 1976 [1976] C
Anales 1021.
25. Ley 21.258, art. 5, March 24, 1976 [19761 C Anales 1032.
26. Acta para Considerar Ia Conducta de Aquellas personas Responsables de Ocasionar
Perjuicios a los Superiores Intereses de la Naci6n, art. 1 June 18, 1976 [1976] C Anales 1975.
27. Id., art. 1(a).
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time restrictions might be imposed against practicing a profession
and the disposition of personal property."8
The junta took its state-of-siege power under article 23 quite
seriously and also used it to suspend other constitutional guaran-
tees as well. Laws promulgated by the junta reached almost all
forms of social life capable of generating discussion or activity of-
fensive to the government. A flurry of statutes and decrees, in-
structions, special provisions and resolutions criminalized partici-
pation in either political parties,"' or labor strikes;80 publication of
all news items concerning terrorist activity, subversion, abductions
or the discovery of bodies, unless officially announced;' various
modes of criticism of official policies in university classrooms;32 and
all "political acts" that relate to a political party, regardless of
whether such acts resulted in concrete action.8"
In addition, penalties for a wide range of activities already
proscribed under the Penal Code were made dramatically more se-
vere: a breach of the peace punishable by a fine or 30 days' con-
finement became a federal offense punishable by imprisonment for
up to ten years.3 4 The sentence for the old crime of "illicit associa-
tion" rose from 3-8 years to 5-12 years.35 The death penalty, abol-
ished in 1972, was revived, and would now be carried out within 48
hours of the sentence, leaving little time to file an appeal." The
age of majority for criminal responsibility was reduced from 18 to
16 years for certain crimes. 7
In 1976, the junta saw itself as the guardian of the national
heritage, the exponent of the noblest values of Argentine society
and the true defenders of its constitution. As such, it claimed to
exercise state power legitimately. One problem it faced in its effort
28. Id. art. 2.
29. Acta para el Proceso de Reorganizaci6n Nacional, art. 7, March 26, 1976 [1976] C
Anales 1019.
30. Id., art. 8; Ley 21.400, Sept. 3, 1976, [1976] C Anales 2116.
31. Communique 19, Delito de Prensa, March 24, 1976.
32. Ley 21.276, March 29, 1976, [19761 C Anales 1041.
33. Ley 21.322, June 2, 1976, [1976] C Anales 1102; Ley 21.325, June 2, 1976, [1976] C
Anales 1104.
34. Ley de Represi6n del Sabotaje, Decreto 21.264, art. 1, March 24, 1976, [19761 C
Anales 1034.
35. Ley 21.338, June 25, 1976, [1976] C Anales 1125 (amending art. 210 bis, C6digo
Penal de la Naci6n).
36. Ley 21.338, June 25, 1976, [1976] C Anales 1113 (amending art. 5, 5 bis, C6digo
Penal de la Naci6n).
37. Ley 21.272, March 26, 1976, [1976] C Anales 1038.
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to remake an Argentine society in its own image was to identify
and declare a panoply of behaviors as criminal which were for-
merly viewed under the law as inoffensive, or relatively inoffen-
sive-and to do so in a manner that would not do violence to the
cautionary language of article 23. The open-textured penal pro-
gram that it wove through the acts, statutes, decrees and resolu-
tions of its first few months in office neatly served that purpose.
Subsequently, an even greater challenge arose as the junta at-
tempted to create a mechanism to enforce these stern, repressive
measures in the face of the clear warning of article 23 that the
executive "shall not convict or apply punishment upon [its] own
authority." 8 It was here that the junta made its peculiarly maca-
bre contribution to the law of the state of siege. One law author-
ized the armed forces, security forces and the ordinary police to
investigate crimes of subversion and to interrogate, detain, and
gather evidence for summary proceedings.89 Another authorized
the same personnel, when investigating subversive activity, to ar-
rest anyone on suspicion alone wherever there were strong indica-
tions or "half-conclusive proofs" of guilt.40 One law authorized the
security forces to use firearms when a person apprehended for a
mere breach of the peace in flagrante delicto "does not cease upon
the first warning."'4' Suspects could be detained indefinitely pend-
ing the accumulation of incriminating or exculpatory evidence, 42 or
they could be dealt with through summary proceedings before spe-
cial military tribunals.43 Conversely, the enforcers were themselves
virtually immune from challenge: one early statute assigned severe
penalties for committing "any violent act" against military person-
nel, security forces or police officers. 4' Another provided that all
such officials would be subject only to military jurisdiction with
respect to "infringements which they may commit during or in oc-
casion of the execution of the missions imposed by the particular
military command.' 4
This legislation made it possible for a wholly unofficial law to
develop within the finely wrought edifice of the junta's law. Mili-
38. CONSTITUCI6N, supra note 12, art. 23.
39. Ley 21.461, Nov. 19, 1976, [1976] C Anales 2895.
40. Ley 21.460, arts. 1, 9, Nov. 18, 1976, [1976] C Anales 2894.
41. Ley 21.264, art. 5, March 24, 1976, [1976) C Anales 1035.
42. Ley 21.461, supra note 39.
43. Id.
44. Ley 21.272, art. 1, supra note 37.
45. Ley 21.267, art. 1, Mar. 24, 1976, [1976] C Anales 1036.
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tary personnel, security forces and the police were now able to
roam city streets at will, veritable sovereignties in competition only
with each other. The military did not act by "convicting" or "pun-
ishing" the enemies of the state they might identify, or proceeding
in a manner beyond the autholity committed to the junta by arti-
cle 23 and delegated in turn to them by the junta's volley of proc-
lamations. Instead, they proceeded by "detaining" those enemies
for days, weeks, months, and sometimes years on end;" torturing
them; 17 and finally, perhaps more mercifully, "disappearing"
them.4 8 Thus, there was a law within a law, for a state within a
state. Or, more accurately, a sphere of utter lawlessness beneath
the facade of an official lawfulness bankrupt of any real content.
The one a mask to disguise the other,4 9 grinning its ghoulish grin
at all those who still held dear some hope and faith in the virtue
and power of mere legality.
III. THE JUDICIAL RESPONSE
Indeed, the Argentine judiciary has grown increasingly asser-
tive on behalf of constitutional values in the years since the golpe.
The Supreme Court has traditionally insisted that the Constitu-
tion, as at least a legal form, survives the declaration of a state of
siege in even the direst of emergencies. Although the court has
noted that article 23 may provide for the suspension of constitu-
tional safeguards in the area under siege, it concluded that it does
not justify the suspension of the Constitution itself in its
entirety."
Measures adopted under a state of siege, for example, that
would fundamentally and permanently restructure the political au-
thority of the nation would contravene the very essence of the
Constitution and would thus fall beyond the contemplation of arti-
46. See generally, IACHR Report, supra note 9, at 139-177; Amnesty International Re-
port, supra note 9, at 17-26.
47. See generally, IACHR Report, supra note 9, at 199-215; Amnesty International Re-
port, supra note 9, at 36-39; Amnesty International, Testimony on Secret Detention Camps
in Argentina (1980).
48. See generally, IACHR Report, supra note 9, at 53-138; Amnesty International Re-
port, supra note 9, at 27-35; Amnesty International, Political Killings by Governments 50-
55 (1983); see also A. GRAHAM-YOOLL, A MATTER OF FEAR: PORTRAIT OF AN ARGENTINE EXILE
81-89 (1982).
49. I am indebted for the imagery to Corradi, The Mode of Destruction: Terror in Ar-
gentina, 16 TELOS 61, 70 (1982-83).
50. Causa CCCLIII, Leandro N. Alem y Mariano N. Candioti, 54 Fallos de la Corte
Suprema de Justicia de la Naci6n 432 (1893) [hereinafter cited as Fallos].
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cle 23.1' Furthermore, an emergency does not authorize the execu-
tive to create new powers sua sponte: "it only justifies the exercise
of those powers that are expressly or implicitly authorized in the
Constitution [including, of course, article 231 .'52 Most juridical
statements addressing the propriety of executive action taken dur-
ing states of siege in Argentine history have amounted to little
more than verbal pinball of this sort. Opinions on such matters
often read like the poetry of the Tudor courtiers: pleasant, polite,
reassuring and harmless.
More recently, states of siege have become less exceptional
and more a commonplace of Argentine political life.53 As a result,
the Court has entertained an increasing number of habeas corpus
petitions 4 pleading for interpretations of the Constitution that
would presume to regulate the conduct of the powerful more
closely.
Until 1959, the Court customarily and unanimously read arti-
cle 23 as authorizing the suspension of all individual rights and
freedoms.56 Since then, it has begun to forge a version of the in-
strumental rationalism of North American constitutional jurispru-
dence" to fashion a "means-end" test of the "reasonableness" of
such restrictions. The dissenting opinion of Justice Alfredo Orgaz
in the case of Antonio Sofia heralded this development. Orgaz sug-
gested that only individual rights whose exercise contributed to the
onset of an emergency should be subject to the extraordinary pow-
ers of the executive during the state of siege and should not be
subject to judicial review. He felt that otherwise, the Court should
51. Id.
52. Oscar Agustin Avico v. Saul G. de Is Pesa, 172 Fallos 21 (1935).
53. From 1930 through 1976 there have been 10 successful coups d'etat or glopes
d'estado in Argentina, usually preceded or accompanied by a declaration of a state of siege
(estado de sitio). See K. KARsT & K.S. ROSENN, LAW AND DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA: A
CASE BOOK 185 (1975); R.A. POTASH, THE ARMY AND POLITICS IN ARGENTINA, 1928-1945
(1969); R.A. POTASH, THE ARMY AND POLITICS IN ARGENTINA, 1945-1962: PEH6N TO FRONDIZI
(1980).
54. The habeas corpus procedure is described in arts. 617-644 of the C6digo de
Procedemientos en lo Criminal pars Ia Justicia Federal, (I.F. Dova de Zavalia ed. 1979).
Official action may also be challenged in amparo proceedings under Ley 16.986, Oct. 18,
1966, [1966] Leyes Nacionales 175. For a description of amparo proceedings in Latin
America, see generally, H. Fix-Zamudio, The Writ of Amparo in Latin America, 13 LAW.
AM. 361 (1981).
55. Jos6 Guillermo Bertotto, 160 Fallos 104 (1931); Herrero v. Consejo de Reconstruc-
cion de San Juan, 266 Fallos 34, 41 (1966).
56. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191 (1964); United States v. Carolene
Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
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apply ordinary tests of reasonableness in reviewing official actions
not directly related to the restoration of order.5 7 Since then, a ma-
jority of the Court has held that only a limited number of rights
and freedoms may reasonably be suspended during a state of
siege-those which are "incompatible in each case with ...
threats to order."5 8
This constituted the analytical framework within which the
Court has approached allegations of human rights violations in
habeas corpus petitions since the junta assumed control of the Ar-
gentine government. Among the more significant of its decisions
are the Carlos Mariano Zamorano,50 Cesar Ollero6° and Jacobo
Timermanei cases. Each is instructive of the character of the role
that judicial review can play during a state of siege.
Zamorano was a lawyer who had been arrested shortly after
the Isabel Per6n regime declared Argentina to be under a state of
siege in late 1974. His was the first habeas corpus petition the
Court allowed to challenge arrests executed during a state of siege.
Previously, such arrests were reviewable only if they violated arti-
cle 23, by forestalling the prisoner's right to exercise the option to
leave the country.62 Zamorano held that it was proper for the judi-
ciary to review the "reasonableness" of these arrests. 3 This meant
that the government had to be able to offer "particular facts" link-
ing the detention to the causes of the state of siege; otherwise, the
Court would not be able to conduct a fruitful review. "The execu-
tive is bound to provide a clear basis in each case so that a compe-
tent judge may accurately determine the proper extent to which
exceptional powers should apply."" The opinion concluded with a
message to the President to provide the specific facts requested by
the Court of Criminal Appeals bearing on the reasonableness of
Zamorano's detention.
Cesar Ollero brought a habeas corpus petition in an effort to
unearth facts that might lead him to the discovery of the wherea-
bouts of his daughter, Inks Ollero, who had disappeared from Bue-
57. Antonio Sofia, 243 Fallos 504, 529 (1959) (Orgaz. J., dissenting).
58. Daniel Mallo, 282 Fallos 392, 397 (1972).
59. Carlos Mariano Zamorano, 298 Fallos 441 (1977).
60. In6s Ollero, 300 Fallos 457 (1978).
61. Jacobo Timerman, 300 Fallos 816 (1978), 301 Fallos 771 (1979).
62. G.J. BIDART CAMPOS, THE ARGENTINE SUPREME COURT. THE COURT OF CONSTITU-
TIONAL GUARANTEES 104 (W.J. Brisk trans. 1982).




nos Aires in 1976.65 Typically, a habeas corpus petition is proper
only where it is levelled against an identifiable official alleged to be
responsible for a person's detention."0 It is not possible, of course,
to establish with any real certainty the official responsible for the
"detention" of a person who has [been] "disappeared." Thus, it is
not possible, then, in theory, to use habeas corpus to penetrate the
wall of secrecy obscuring the fate of the thousands of victims of the
enforcers of the law of the "state within the state." Such, in es-
sence, was the argument of the Attorney General in Ollero.s7 The
Court agreed that the file lacked evidence that Inks Ollero was
presently in the custody of security forces. It pointed out, however,
that there was evidence that she had been among a group of bus
passengers who had all last been seen when they were being taken
to a particular police station in Buenos Aires; therefore, the matter
could not end here. Habeas corpus, the Court said, was created "to
immediately restore freedom to persons deprived of it," and to do
so "requires the exhaustion of judicial procedures."' 9 The judge of
the court of origin, then, "should have broadened the investiga-
tion" and taken the "necessary measures" to "duly clarify" the wo-
man's "status and personal situation," as well as the "truth of the
events."0 9 The Court concluded by remanding the case to the lower
court with instruction to conduct such an investigation into the
desaparecida's whereabouts.
Jacobo Timerman was arrested April 21, 1977, under a special
executive decree, at the request of the Commander-in-Chief of the
Army.7 0 He was detained because of his association with David
Graiver, the publisher of La Opini6n, the Buenos Aires newspaper
Timerman edited. Graiver was suspected of having provided sub-
stantial sums of money to the Montofieros, one of the largest of the
left-wing political groups that had engaged in terrorist activities in
the 1970's. Graiver was killed in an airplane accident while out of
the country in early April, 1977. Decree 1093/77 ordered Timer-
man's arrest on grounds that he had a "direct and close relation-
ship with the causes that motivated the declaration of a state of
siege. 171 Five months later, after a period of interrogation and tor-
65. Ollero, supra note 60, at 457.
66. C6digo de Procedimientos en lo Criminal, supra note 54, arts. 617, 622.
67. Ollero, supra note 60, at 458-59.
68. Id., at 461.
69. Id.
70. Timerman, supra note 61, at 818-19.
71. Id., at 819.
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ture in the army's custody,72 he was tried and acquitted by a Spe-
cial War Council, under The Code of Military Justice .7 The junta
then ordered that he be placed under house arrest and deprived
him of both his political rights and his right to employment under
the Act to Consider the Conduct of Those Persons Who Prejudice
the Higher Interests of the Nation.7'
On habeas corpus, the Supreme Court held Timerman's house
arrest unconstitutional. His acquittal by the Special War Council,
it said, vitiated any connection between Timerman's association
with Graiver and the "causes that motivated the declaration of a
state of siege." Thus, the decree under which he was first arrested
could no longer serve as the basis for continued detention.7 Fur-
thermore, the junta's resolution ordering his house arrest after the
acquittal was not based upon any evidence of a direct relationship
between Timerman and the causes of the state of siege; it thus
amounted to the issuance of a "punishment" not authorized by ar-
ticle 23 of the Constitution." The Court therefore ordered his
release.
These cases are often cited as evidence of the continuing vital-
ity of the rule of law in Argentina and of the real, albeit limited,
achievements of the country's historically independent judiciary,
all in a period when conventional legal processes and institutions
were subject to extraordinary pressure. 77 Such a conclusion would
follow, only upon an over-reading of these cases. An even stronger
argument can be made that the outcome of these proceedings illus-
trates, as graphically as ever, the incapacity of formal legal process
to restrain in any significant way the exercise of executive power
during states of siege.
Thus, the Zamorano mandate that the executive specify the
particular facts that a court might assess in evaluating the "reason-
ableness" of an arrest has simply provided the government with a
comparatively uncomplicated formula to follow to establish the le-
gality of its actions. One experienced Court-watcher observed that
simple statements to the effect that a prisoner has engaged in sub-
72. For Timerman's personal account of the ordeal, see J. TIMERMAN, PRISONER WITH-
OUT A NAME, CELL WITHouT A NUMBER 9-14, 47-50 (T. Talbot trans. 1982).
73. Id., at 128, 129; Timerman, supra note 61, at 820.
74. Resoluci6n 6 (Junta Militar), Nov. 10, 1977 [19781 C Anales 3.
75. Timerman, supra note 61, at 779-80.
76. Id., at 782.
77. BIDART CAMPOS, supra note 62, at 99-110; IACHR Report, supra note 9, at 231, note
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versive activities "have been sufficient to warrant continued
imprisonment."7 8
Despite the pyrotechnics of the Ollero opinion and its support
of independent trial judge investigations into the whereabouts of
desaparecidos who are the subjects of habeas corpus proceedings,
such inquiries have failed to yield any positive results. As Pedro
Narvaiz suggested after resigning from his judgeship on the federal
court of criminal appeals in Buenos Aires, Ollero has made one
more opportunity available to the state to keep the promise of law
to the ear, and break it to the hope: "no one actually obstructs the
judges in their investigations, but still there are never any an-
swers." 9 In6s Ollero herself, interestingly enough, is still missing.
Timerman, it is true, won his freedom. But not because of the
Court's decision on his habeas corpus petition. This went ignored
by the army generals responsible for his detention, who even went
so far as to suggest that the judges ordering his release resign from
their positions on the Supreme Court.80 It was not until President
Videla, after yielding to a forceful international campaign on Tim-
erman's behalf, threatened to resign that the army capitu-
lated-which even then they did not quite do. The generals' final
solution to the Timerman case was not to release the man, as the
Court had ordered, but to nullify his citizenship, confiscate his
property and expel him from Argentina."
The Court, moreover, has never directly addressed the core
questions of the legality of the junta's overall performance in of-
fice. Standard bearer of procedural regularity though it is, it has
never addressed the issue. It has, for example, refused to review
the lawfulness of the state of siege itself. It consistently holds the
junta's declarations thereon to be non-justiciable political ques-
tions," even though article 23 suggests the need for the existence
of "internal disorder" or "foreign invasion" to justify a state of
siege. In 1981, one appellate court judge declared the state of siege
to be unconstitutional; revealingly, a few days after issuing the
opinion, he left his post and fled the country.83
78. Bidart Campos, supra note 62, at 105-106.
79. Quoted in R. Fernandez Taboada & J. Vidal, Quign es Pedro Narvaiz, Somos, Feb.
11, 1983, at 8.
80. TIMERMAN, supra note 72, at 129.
81. Id.
82. See, e.g., Zamorano, supra note 59, at 441; Timerman, supra note 61, at 816, 771.
83. Fernandez Taboada and Vidal, supra note 79, at 10.
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The Court has never managed, moreover, even to scratch the
surface of the problem of the desaparecidos, or to formally con-
template the magnitude of the power that paramilitary forces have
wielded so effectively and so clandestinely since the junta took of-
fice. Neither statute nor rule of court has authorized anything like
a class action, for example, that might formally bring to life the
grievances of Las Madres de la Plaza de Mayo. The Court has
never even expressly declared illegal the junta's singularly most
overt and explicit violation of a specific provision of article 23, its
suspension of a prisoner's option to leave the country."4
It would be a mistake, however, to sing some wistful dirge for
the Argentine judiciary's failures and omissions over the past sev-
eral years, and to suggest that is "missed opportunities" are in any
way the key to real insight into the problem of the state of law
during a state of siege. The problem is not simply that conven-
tional forms of legal process is Argentina-courts, judges, lawyers,
habeas corpus, "the law"-have been ineffective as brakes on the
junta's exercise of executive power. After all, what else might one
have expected? The problem is that legal process, ostensibly avail-
able as a quasi-autonomous mechanism to challenge and check ex-
ecutive power, may ironically have functioned as an unsuspecting
accomplice in the junta's very efforts to consolidate that power.
The convoluted process of human rights litigation, leading as
it does in Argentina to the publication of judicial opinions in cases
like Zamorano, Ollero, and Timerman, has had the effect of gener-
ating a discourse of rationality, a language of reasonableness, as a
tool for the portrayal and analysis of government behavior during
the state of siege. The junta, as a party to this litigation, has ac-
quired a voice in this discourse. The formal outcome of these cases
has turned on such issues as the "sufficiency" of the facts offered
by the state as evidence "justifying" the detention of a prisoner,
the "connection" between a particular prisoner, the "causes" of the
emergency and the government's "conduct" in arresting the per-
son. The implication here is that the behavior of the junta and its
84. Estado de sitio-suspension del derecho de opci6n para salir del pais, Mar. 24, 1976,
(1976] C Anales 1022-23; Acta Institucional, Sept. 21, 1977, [19771 C Anales 3664. The Su-
preme Court faced a challenge to the legality of that action in a recent habeas corpus peti-
tion; it held that the President might well be entitled to deny a prisoner's right to exercise
the option of self-exile in exceptional cases where the sanction it orders is house arrest.
Benito Alberto Moya, 303 Fallos 696 (1981). It has been suggested that this "compromise"
between court, junta and Constitution "undoubtedly falls short of Article 23." BIDART CAM-
Pas, supra note 62, at 109.
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subordinate officials is susceptible to a mode of description that
includes such terms as "reasonableness" and "rational." A judicial
declaration of official illegality in a case like Zamorano or OQlero or
Timerman suggests at least the possibility that official action may
be legal in some other case, and that except for this case, the junta
may well be operating within a field of legality.
From the junta's perspective, it matters not whether the gov-
ernment "wins" or "loses" one case or another. It will always find a
way to disregard or neutralize the effects of a really threatening
decision like Zamorano or Ollero. What is important is that it ap-
pears to be an actual player in the game of legal rhetoric, a partner
with court, petitioner, and legal analysis in the search for legality
and justification. Legal process has thus been singularly important
in the mobilization of state terror in that it has enabled the junta
to address society not only through the amplifier at the rally, the
proclamation in the newspaper, the rifle butt on the street, and the
electrode in the torture chamber, but through a vocabulary of rea-
son and right as well. It is for this reason that the junta in Argen-
tina, like its counterpart in other Latin American states, preserves
the courts intact during the administration of a state of siege. 5
Political factions it will exterminate, political parties it will sus-
pend, and the legislature it will dissolve.80 But the courts stay open
for business, producing their discourse on right and wrong that in-
directly but powerfully, by inference alone, draws the junta into
the enviable world of formal rationality where it shares the bene-
fits that only an apparatus of justification can confer.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Argentine case as described demonstrates something
about one possible relationship between state, power and law in a
society struggling to contain the violence that is the byproduct of
widespread and conflicting pressures for revolutionary political and
economic transformation.87 It tells us something about the role of
85. General Agusto Pinochet Ugarte, on assuming the Presidency of Chile as leader of
the military junta that overturned the government of Salvador Allende Gossens on Sept. 11,
1973, ordered the collapse of executive and legislative powers into one body, but allowed the
judiciary to continue functioning as usual. Decreto Ley 27, Sept. 11, 1973, Gaceta Oficial 28,
653, Sept. 24, 1973; Decreto Ley 1, Sept. 11, 1973, Gaceta Oficial 28, 653, Sept. 18, 1973.
86. Acta Fijando el Proposito, supra note 23.
87. For descriptions of the events leading up to the junta's assumption of power in 1976
and of the Argentine political background generally, see J. Corradi, Argentina: A Story Be-
hind a War, in DEMOCRACY AND DIC'rATORSHIP IN LATIN AMERICA 31 (I. Howe ed. 1982); B.
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legal conventions as integral elements in the consolidation of au-
thoritarian rule during a state of siege. It also indicates something
about the subtle contribution of formal rationality to the construc-
tion of that edifice of justification that allows an "official" state
apparatus to screen from view the terror exercised on its behalf by
its homuncular state. As such, it may lend useful insight into the
process of legitimation of authoritarian rule in many other "depen-
dent" societies as well."
The Argentine people today, however, may be telling us an
even more important story, a story of the crucial limitations of this
process. The efforts of the junta to vindicate itself for the excesses
of its past and the fate of the desaparecidos have met only rejec-
tion, pervasive and total rejection. The demand for a public ac-
counting is vocal and continuous. Words having failed it, the junta,
in its final hours, apparently began to dip into its other arsenal,
subduing some of the opposition by dispatching its leaders to a
state of permanent silence through the bullet in the night.8 9 The
marches continued nonetheless; the processions through the streets
of Buenos Aires and the Plaza de Mayo,' 0 in displays of defiance
and hope, hope that the junta will appear at last before the people,
naked of its power. The demonstrations called on the junta to
stand for judgment, as if the requirement of residencia, that old
nuisance for the viceroys, were reaching out of the Latin American
past to try to catch the junta in its contradictions.
Perhaps the junta was wrong in its strategy all along. Perhaps
the pretense to legality it has cultivated so assiduously all these
years has somehow managed to create a demand that the truth of
justice we all can understand peel away that false face and expose
its lie of "law" for what it is.
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88. The continuing tendency toward militarization of political life in Latin America and
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REvOLUTION' MILITARIZATION AND CONSOLIDATION IN THE THIRD WORLD (1982) A. STEPAN,
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